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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 000459

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [UNSC](#) [PGOV](#) [UNMOVIC](#) [IZ](#)

SUBJECT: UN/IRAQ: PERRICOS PRESSES SECURITY COUNCIL TO
CLOSE UNMOVIC

REF: STATE 34758

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Bolton, Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Begin Summary. In his briefing to the UNSC, Acting UNMOVIC Chairman Demitrius Perricos urged the UNSC to address UNMOVIC's mandate and discussed in detail his concerns about the chemical weapons (CW) site at Muthanna. He also highlighted Iraq's failure to engage thus far on this file. Almost all UNSC members said it is time to review UNMOVIC's mandate three years after the overthrow of Saddam's regime and to close the organization, although there was varying interest in retaining some of the mission's expertise and functions. There was some frustration, especially among the newly elected members, that the UNSC had not acted on the issue. Council members were generally enthusiastic about UNMOVIC's plans for a training manual for weapons inspectors, the organization of its archives, and the possible publication of the Compendium summary as a UNSC document. China, France and the UK spoke only briefly. It appears that they want the P5 to agree to next steps on UNMOVIC before the full Council substantively addresses the issue. In contrast, Russian PR Denisov, referring to recent talks between Perricos and FM Lavrov, proposed UNMOVIC submission to the UNSC of a complete report on Iraqi disarmament, based upon the classified ISG report, ISG-UNMOVIC meetings, and inspection of Iraqi sites. He also urged a transitional period during which UNMOVIC would help the Iraqis create a national import/export regime, and called for new inspections of the WMD sites in Iraq. Ambassador Sanders, noting the primary focus in Iraq has properly been the electoral process and government formation, provided an update on efforts to safeguard Muthanna and said we are not yet ready to publish the compendium summary as a UNSC document. End Summary.

Perricos Statement

¶2. (C) Reporting Period - Key Events: Perricos introduced to the UNSC the SYG's quarterly report on UNMOVIC (S/2006/133), which covers activities December 1 - February 28. Perricos said he met with Russian FM Lavrov and DFM Yakovenko in Moscow in February and Lavrov had reiterated to him that the Iraq WMD file should be closed with a UNSCR and with Iraqi involvement. Perricos said that he had told Lavrov UNMOVIC stands prepared to assist at UNSC invitation and had asked

the UNSC to review UNMOVIC's mandate as soon as possible. Perricos said the Iraqi authorities have not responded to his September 2005 letter requesting a dialogue between UNMOVIC and the Iraqi National Monitoring Directorate (NMD).

¶3. (C) Compendium Summary: Noting that the summary of the Compendium was completed and is intended to be a broad view of lessons learned, and that it carefully avoids the inclusion of sensitive information, Perricos said the College of Commissioners wants the summary published as a UNSC document and asked the UNSC to agree this request.

¶4. (C) Archives: Perricos said the College had an initial discussion of archiving UNMOVIC's sensitive materials and thanked the U.S., UK and France for briefing in capitals on national archive procedures. He said the archives must balance the competing needs for access of historians and protection of sensitive information.

¶5. (C) Training: Perricos reported that training continued during the reporting period. Brazil is currently training experts in biological weapons (BW) inspection regimes, France will soon host a training on inspection of ballistic missiles, and Argentina hosted a training in inspections of solid propellant production sites in November. Perricos said UNMOVIC would produce a training manual for weapons inspectors based on its experiences.

¶6. (C) Dual-Use Goods: Perricos said UNMOVIC staff continue to look for the import into Iraq of dual-use goods that are subject to monitoring, under UNSCR 1051 (1996), and rely on open source material. He pointed to the recent report to the 1540 Committee from Iraq that included a commitment to accede

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to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). He welcomed this commitment, but questioned whether Iraq has the information or framework necessary to provide the initial declaration that the CWC would require. He said UNMOVIC would assist Iraq to prepare this declaration, if requested.

¶7. (C) Muthanna: Noting prior efforts to draw UNSC attention to previously monitored sites in Iraq, Perricos said he has particular concerns about the CW Muthanna site and nearby agricultural activities. He discussed in detail concerns that two bunkers at Muthanna - the contents of which were not fully determined by UNSCOM and which were sealed in 1994 - pose a threat to human health and farming activities in the area. He said UNMOVIC last inspected the site in March 2003, and the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) had reported that the bunkers were breached and scheduled to be re-sealed. (NB: In 1994, the bunkers were sealed, and Iraq agreed to a protocol for their management.) Perricos said he understood from media reports that the Iraqi government was aware of the situation at Muthanna, but did not have the resources to address the problem.

¶8. (C) UNMOVIC Mandate: Perricos urged the UNSC to consider UNMOVIC's mandate as soon as possible and to consider in its deliberations: criteria for declaring Iraq disarmed, the value of independent verification, the ISG report, remaining uncertainty about Iraqi disarmament, and the need for a transition to include import/export controls.

P-5 Views

¶9. (C) Russian PR Denisov echoed Perricos' interest in clarifying Iraq's disarmament formally. He asserted that UNMOVIC inspectors in the pre-war period and the subsequent ISG report had shown there were no WMD components; no means of WMD production; and no WMD program in Iraq. He proposed that UNMOVIC submit to the UNSC a complete report on the subject and said preparation of the report might require UNMOVIC to receive the classified version of the ISG report, to meet with the ISG and to inspect sites in Iraq. He said

the UNSC must be the body to decide on Iraq's disarmament; the UNSC assumed responsibility for the issue in the early 1990's and must conclude it. He said the UNSC must consider the unresolved disarmament issues and ensure that Iraq no longer poses threat. Denisov also supported Perricos' call for a transitional period that would include the creation of a national export/import regime, and he welcomed UNMOVIC's initiative to help Iraq acceded to international non-proliferation regimes. He said such cooperation from Baghdad would inspire greater international confidence in the new Iraqi authorities.

¶10. (C) Chinese DPR Yishan stayed close to China's previous points on UNMOVIC. He acknowledged the significant changes in Iraq since UNMOVIC was established and said China is ready to participate in a UNSC discussion of UNMOVIC's mandate. He urged early publication of the compendium to reap the full benefits of UNMOVIC's efforts.

¶11. (C) In a very brief statement, UK Political-Counselor Johnson said the UK hopes for early, substantive discussions of UNMOVIC, and supports publication of the Compendium.

¶12. (C) French Political-Counselor de Riviere said the compendium should be a useful document, but dissemination must be controlled, given the information's sensitivity. He said France is interested in continued training of UNMOVIC experts, which will be useful for long-term expertise. Consistent with previous French statements, he expressed concern about previously monitored sites in Iraq and the threat posed to local populations. He said France is ready to discuss the UNMOVIC/IAEA mandates, but like China and the UK, did not push the issue.

¶13. (C) Per reftel, Ambassador Sanders explained that the focus in Iraq has been on the electoral process and government formation. She said the UNMOVIC/IAEA mandates no longer make a useful contribution and should be reconsidered

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at an appropriate time, per UNSCR 1546. She acknowledged the request to publish the compendium summary as a document of the UNSC, but said the U.S. is not yet prepared to agree to this request. Also drawing on reftel, Ambassador Sanders updated the UNSC on efforts to secure the CW sites at Muthanna, including U.S. Corps of Engineers plans to reinforce the two bunkers and to work with the relevant Iraqi authorities.

E-10 Views

¶14. (C) Peru: PR de Rivero supported UNSC publication of the compendium summary and expressed bewilderment that the UNSC had still not addressed UNMOVIC. He said if there is a *raison d'etre* for the organization, its mandate should be revised; otherwise, it should be closed. He expressed concern about the UNSC's "culture of non-action" and said the UNSC must revise the mandate or close UNMOVIC; the status quo is unacceptable.

¶15. (C) Tanzanian PR Mahiga said the bulk of UNMOVIC's work is completed with only a few exceptions. He also welcomed plans to develop a training manual for weapons inspectors, which could be used by the UN and other organizations, and the compendium's near-completion. He queried the proliferation risk posed by Iraqi scientists and the value of training UNMOVIC staff, if the organization will soon close. (Note: Perricos subsequently answered that the U.S. and EU are funding programs to re-tool Iraqi scientists. He said he had no details about these programs, but that he would welcome such information. Perricos said UNMOVIC would continue to train its experts, until the UNSC revises or ends its mandate. He said the training would be useful, if the UNSC asks UNMOVIC to continue or if UNMOVIC experts become part of a UN roster, as many UNSC members have previously

suggested would be useful. End Note.)

¶16. (C) Congolese Minister-Counselor Okio said the UNSC should review UNMOVIC's mandate, since the work it was mandated to do had been completed, and should decide if there are additional tasks for UNMOVIC. He echoed Perricos' concerns about Muthanna and questioned whether the Iraqis created a national monitoring system or were otherwise cooperating with UNMOVIC. (Note: Perricos said he had no additional information about the NMD and reiterated that he had received no Iraqi response to his September 2005 letter. End Note.)

¶17. (C) Greek Minister Counselor Papadopoulou said Athens looks forward to the compendium and UNMOVIC's training manual. She also welcomed UNMOVIC's work on its archives. She said she expects the UNSC to discuss UNMOVIC's mandate sooner rather than later and that retention of lessons learned should be part of this discussion.

¶18. (C) Ghanaian PR Effah-Apenteng expressed concern about UNMOVIC's "legal limbo" since March 2003 and repeated UNSC commitments to address the issue. He said the UNSC must decide on Iraq's disarmament and UNMOVIC's mandate. He urged a transition period when UNMOVIC could help the new Iraqi government and expressed support for UNSC publication of the compendium summary. He welcomed UNMOVIC willingness to help Iraq accede to the CWC and urged the UNSC to consider how best to use UNMOVIC expertise. He suggested the organization could be retained as a standby, permanent inspection unit. He expressed concern about the Muthanna site and the need for the Iraqi authorities to implement the appropriate protocols.

¶19. (C) Japanese DPR Kitaoka said UNSC discussion of UNMOVIC's mandate is long overdue, and his government stands ready to participate in the discussion. He welcomed UNMOVIC efforts on its archives and the compendium.

¶20. (C) Slovak PR Burian welcomed UNMOVIC efforts to close the Iraq WMD file and U.S. efforts to address concerns about Muthanna; he urged the Iraqis also to take the necessary steps. As Chair of the 1540 Committee, he urged Iraq to accede to the CWC and all other non-proliferation instruments

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and advised the UNSC to draw lessons from UNMOVIC for other UN bodies, including his own committee.

¶21. (C) Danish DPR Faaborg-Andersen said, given the current circumstances, a review of the UNMOVIC mandate is long overdue, and consultations should begin, with an eye to closing UNMOVIC in consultation with Iraqi authorities. He also said the UNSC should consider what UNMOVIC expertise might be retained.

¶22. (C) Qatari Minister-Counselor Al-Bader supported closure of UNMOVIC, given the lack of Iraqi threat, and said Iraq needs rebuilding more than anything else. He asked how UNMOVIC's training is funded. (Note. Perricos subsequently recalled that all UNMOVIC activities, including training, are funded by the OFF escrow account. End Note.)

¶23. (C) Argentine PR Mayoral agreed that the UNMOVIC/IAEA mandates should be reviewed, since the issue has been outstanding for some time, and with the new constitutionally elected government, it is time to move ahead.

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